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Self-epistemic authority (SEA) refers to the subjective judgement of the level of expertise and 
knowledge a person has in a given domain. While it is reasonable to assume that people's percep-
tion of SEA reflects their level of objective knowledge in the given domain, there is evidence to 
show that people are not optimal judges of their own knowledge. Thus, the present study exam-
ined the interaction between the participants’ trait-like characteristics of need for cognitive closure 
(NFC) and efficacy to fulfill the need for cognitive closure (EFNC), which affects the use of cognitive 
structuring, as a source of SEA. Results of the study confirm that objective knowledge as well as 
a cognitive-motivational epistemic process (interaction between NFC and EFNC) affect SEA. For 
high EFNC individuals, the effect of NFC on SEA was positive. However, for low EFNC individuals, 
the relationship was negative. 
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The concept of self-epistemic authority (SEA) refers to the subjective 
judgement of the level of expertise and knowledge a person has in a 
given domain. The concept is derived from the more general notion 
of epistemic authority (EA), which was introduced by Kruglanski 
(1989) as a part of his lay epistemic theory. Epistemic authority ad-
dresses the extent to which an individual is inclined to treat a source of 
information (e.g., other people, magazines, the Internet) as valid and 
unquestioned (for a review, see Kruglanski, 2012). High EA may be so 
powerful that it can override other sources of information and exert 
a determinative influence on individuals’ opinions and corresponding 
behaviors. People process the information from high EA sources as 
more definite, they are more certain of it, and they tend to act more in 
accordance with its implications (Kruglanski, 2012). 
A significant and unique aspect of EA is that both the self and ex-
ternal sources may be assigned varying degrees of EA in different 
domains. Ascribing high EA to oneself (i.e., self-epistemic authority 
—SEA) means that an individual believes in his/her own expertise or 
knowledgeability in a given domain (Ellis & Kruglanski, 1992). This 
self-source, similarly to external sources, may determine information 
processing, decision-making, and actions - the greater an individual’s 
SEA in a given domain, the more certain they are about their knowl-
edge or judgment in that domain and the less external information 
they will seek (Kruglanski et al., 2005). Additionally, in the event of an 
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inconsistency between the high SEA person and any other source of 
information relevant to the SEA domain, the person will tend to accept 
his/her own beliefs as more accurate and valid than those implied by 
the other source. 
Although it may seem reasonable to assume that people's percep-
tion of their SEA reliably reflects their actual level of knowledge in 
the given domain, in fact, inconsistent findings have been reported 
across studies regarding the relationship between the actual level of 
knowledge and its perception. Some research demonstrates relatively 
low correlations between the actual knowledge and its perception in 
different domains (Naughton & Friesner, 2012). In some studies on 
confidence and test performance, individuals showed a tendency to be 
overconfident in their ability to provide correct answers (e.g., Radecki 
& Jaccard, 1995). On the other hand,  significant positive correlations 
between measures of these two knowledge constructs have been found 
in some studies, such as the correlation of .54 reported by Brucks 
(1985) for objective and subjective knowledge of sewing machines or 
the correlation of .33 between the objective and subjective knowledge 
of birth control in the study by Radecki and Jaccard (1995). These 
results suggest that, even though the actual extent of knowledge dem-
onstrated by the individuals remains related to their - SEA, it explains 
a relatively low percent of variance in SEA, which indicates that SEA is 
also affected by factors other than actual knowledge. We suggest that 
the belief concerning one's own level of expertise (SEA) is influenced 
by the epistemic motivation affecting the extent and direction of the 
cognitive activity so as to produce a desired conclusion and grant it 
sufficient certainty. 
Epistemic Motivation as a Source 
of Self-Epistemic Authority
A critical aspect of Kruglanski's (1989) lay epistemic theory is the 
presumption of fundamental interdependence between the cognitive 
and motivational aspects of the knowledge formation/modification 
process. The initiation and termination of this process largely depends 
on the person’s epistemic motivation. A central motivational construct 
in lay epistemic theory is the need for cognitive closure (NFC), which 
is defined as the need to have an answer on a given topic, as opposed to 
further ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Need for cognitive closure represents a stable individual trait as 
well as a state-like characteristic. In its trait-like form, NFC has been 
described as a tendency to reduce discomfort experienced in the face of 
cognitive uncertainty through quick formulation of a hypothesis (seiz-
ing) and its rapid validation (epistemic freezing). Cognitive processes 
used by high-NFC individuals to reduce uncertainty are characterized 
by cognitive structuring, that is, they are category-based, nonsystemat-
ic, and heuristic. In contrast, low-NFC individuals prefer to reduce un-
certainty by using piecemeal or individuation processes. Consequently, 
high NFC people tend to be more certain of their conclusions than low 
NFC people, because they are able to ignore information (epistemic 
freezing) that increases uncertainty, that is, schema-inconsistent in-
formation, and to direct attention toward schema-consistent informa-
tion that increases certainty (Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 2013; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). Given the tendency of people to maintain positive 
perceptions of various important characteristics they possess (Judge & 
Bono, 2001), it can be assumed that higher NFC may lead to higher 
SEA by virtue of the high NFC individual’s tendency to avoid informa-
tion which may weaken their certainty in their preferred cognition. 
In contrast, lower NFC may result in a more accurate perception, and 
therefore, a closer relationship between SEA and level of objective 
knowledge. 
However, the notion that high NFC predisposes people to use more 
simplified and effortless processing, implying that cognitive structuring 
is an automatic and easy default option, has been challenged by Bar-Tal 
(1994; Bar-Tal, Kishon-Rabin, & Tabak, 1997; Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 
2013). In his cognitive motivational model, Bar-Tal postulates that 
sometimes, cognitive structuring cannot be employed, even by per-
sons with a high NFC. The fact that some people would like to reduce 
their uncertainty by means of cognitive structuring does not imply that 
they perceive themselves as able to do so. Similarly, the fact that some 
people favor reducing their uncertainty through a piecemeal, effortful 
epistemic process does not mean that they will perceive themselves as 
capable of doing so. Therefore, people may not act upon their epistemic 
need. The central concept in this model is the efficacy to fulfil the need 
for cognitive closure (EFNC). It is defined as the perceived ability to 
achieve certainty using the processes consistent with one’s NFC. For 
high NFC persons, this means the efficacy to (a) avoid information 
that clashes with their existing knowledge and/or (b) cease validating 
their knowledge at an early stage of the process. For low NFC persons, 
it means the efficacy of systematic comprehension of all available in-
formation and a prolonged process of validation. However, those low 
EFNC individuals who doubt their ability to achieve certainty that way 
tend to use largely opposite methods. Therefore, there is a disordinal 
interaction effect between the NFC and EFNC on the person’s epis-
temic behavior. 
In other words, a positive relationship exists between NFC and 
cognitive structuring behaviors only under instances of high EFNC 
However, under low EFNC, the effect of NFC is opposite to that sug-
gested by the lay epistemic theory. That is, for low EFNC individuals, 
there is a negative relationship between NFC and instances of cogni-
tive structuring such as lower certainty, a longer process of informa-
tion gathering, attention to inconsistent information, and less biased 
information processing (Bar-Tal, 1994; Bar-Tal, et. al 1997; Bar-Tal & 
Kossowska, 2010; Kossowska & Bar-Tal, 2013).
Thus, a three-way interaction (knowledge × NFC × EFNC) between 
NFC and objective knowledge on the one hand, and the moderating ef-
fect of EFNC on the relationship between NFC and SEA on the other, 
can be hypothesized. Specifically, for low EFNC individuals, higher 
NFC will be related to a more positive correlation between objective 
knowledge and SEA, that is, a more accurate assessment. In contrast, 
for high EFNC individuals, higher NFC will be associated with a lower 
correlation between knowledge and SEA, that is, a less accurate and 
more biased perception of one’s own knowledge.
The knowledge domain chosen for examination in the current study 
was health, where the role of SEA may be of particular importance. 
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Whereas physician characteristics and recommendations are obvious 
factors likely to influence patients' compliance behaviors, recent devel-
opments in the conceptualization of the reciprocal roles of physicians 
and patients also stress the characteristics of the patient (Krupat, Bell, 
Kravitz, Thom, & Azari,  1996). One of these characteristics may be 
the patient's SEA regarding health. Currently, patients may ascribe EA 
on health not only to physicians but to themselves as well, possibly as 
a consequence of the growing access to medical information, mainly 
on the Internet. Internet-based resources take various forms, including 
informational websites, online journals, textbooks, and social media. 
People are able to obtain substantial amounts of information in almost 
all health-related areas that interest them. Consequently, they may also 
develop a feeling of expertise in the health domain, which, in turn, may 
decrease their willingness to follow their caregivers' recommendations 
(Stasiuk, Bar-Tal, & Maksymiuk, 2016).
METHOD
Participants and Procedure
This study was conducted in Poland. Participants included 173 women 
and 170 men, aged 20–61 years, with a mean age of 35.29, SD = 10.96, 
and a mean number of years of schooling being 15.45, SD = 2.72. Six 
interviewers recruited participants on the street and in two academic 
institutions. Participants were asked the following question for screen-
ing: “Is your profession connected to health care (e.g., physician, nurse, 
paramedic, etc.)?” Respondents who indicated that they worked in a 
healthcare profession were excluded from the final sample. 
People who agreed to take part in the study met the interviewer at 
home or in other convenient settings, such as a university classroom. 
After the study was described to the participants, informing them that 
participation was anonymous, voluntary, and could be withdrawn at 
any time, the participants’ verbal consent was obtained. Participants 




A test consisting of 42 multiple choice items was created on the ba-
sis of a medical handbook for nonprofessionals (Janicki & Barczynski, 
2011), aiming to assess the participants’ objective knowledge of various 
areas of medicine. Evidence of content-based validity was supported by 
use of a panel of six experts—surgeons, physicians specializing in inter-
nal medicine, and orthopedists. These experts reviewed the content of 
each item and confirmed items appropriate for the purpose of the test. 
Twelve of the questions were considered appropriate by fewer than four 
experts, and were omitted as a result. The final version of the Health 
Knowledge Questionnaire consisted of 30 items, in which respondents 
were asked to select the best possible option from a choice of three an-
swers. Cronbach’s α for the scores obtained using the 30-item measure 
was .72. The participants’ level of knowledge was represented by the 
percent of correct answers (M = 72.28, SD = 14.33).
To ensure that the questionnaire was appropriately challenging, 
participants were asked to evaluate the items’ difficulty on a scale from 
1 to 7 (where 1 represented completely not difficult and 7 represented 
very difficult). The questionnaire was evaluated as slightly difficult 
(M = 4.61, SD = 1.28).
NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE
We used four of the five subscales of the 32-item Polish ver-
sion (Kossowska, 2003) of Webster and Kruglanski’s scale (1994): 
Preference for order and structure in the environment, predictability 
of future contexts, affective discomfort occasioned by ambiguity, and 
closed-mindedness. We excluded the decisiveness subscale because it 
has been recognized as tapping efficacy to fulfil cognitive closure but 
not motivation (Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). Respondents rated 27 items 
on a six-point scale (from 1—completely disagree, to 6—completely 
agree). The mean score of all items was 3.79, SD = .56. The higher the 
mean score, the higher the need for cognitive closure (Cronbach’s α 
= .76).
SELF-EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY IN HEALTH
To assess the extent to which participants perceived themselves as 
experts in health, we used a questionnaire developed and validated 
by Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Biran, and Sela (2003). The questionnaire 
consisted of nine statements (e.g., "I have much knowledge on health 
issues," "My arguments in health-related issues are based on verified 
knowledge"), each of which was answered on a six-point scale (from 
1—completely disagree, to 6—completely agree). The mean score for all 
items was calculated (Cronbach’s α = 0.79). The higher the mean score, 
the higher the evaluation of one’s own knowledge in matters of health. 
The mean was 3.37, SD = .68.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the correlation matrix among the study variables. The 
table shows that only objective knowledge was significantly correlated 
with SEA.
We used a three-step hierarchical regression to examine the study 
hypotheses. In the first step, we introduced the three main effects. In 
the second step, we examined the three two-way interactions, and in 
the third step, we examined the effect of the three-way-interaction.
1. 2. 3.
1. Self-Epistemic Authority -
2. Objective Knowledge .17** -
3. Need for Cognitive Closure .01 .03 -
4. Efficacy to Fulfill the Need 
for Cognitive Closure .07 .03 −.21**
TABLE 1.  
The Correlation Matrix
** p < .01
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Table 2 shows that, in the first step, only objective knowledge 
achieved significance and in the second step, only the interaction be-
tween NFC and EFNC achieved significance.
To probe for significant interactions, we performed a moderation 
analysis using Process macro, Model 1, with NFC as an independent 
variable, EFNC as a moderator, SEA as a dependent variable, and ob-
jective knowledge as a covariate, with the option of Johnson – Neyman 
technique (Hayes, 2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). All simple 
slopes of the participants’ SEA on NFC were calculated for each level 
of EFNC, with objective knowledge as a covariate. Table 3 shows that 
regression coefficients of the dependent variable on the participants’ 
NFC increased linearly from the lower level of the participant’s EFNC 
to the highest. Also, Table 3 shows that the regression line was signifi-
cantly negative only from the lowest level of EFNC to the value of 2.31. 
It was significantly positive from 4.65 to 6.00. These results show that 
for low EFNC, NFC had a significant, negative effect on SEA, and for 
high EFNC, NFC had a significant, positive effect on SEA.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the factors which determine individu-
als’ SEA in the health domain. It was based on the assumption that 
people’s perception of their extent of knowledge is influenced not 
only by their actual knowledge, but also by cognitive structuring.The 
results confirmed that the level of the individuals’ objective knowledge 
positively affected thier SEA. This is in line with literature regarding 
the relationship between objective and subjective knowledge (Brucks, 
1985; Carlson, Vincent, Hardesty, & Bearden, 2009; Klerck & Sweeney, 
2007; Radecki & Jaccard, 1995). However, relative to other studies, the 
percent of explained variance was very low (less than 3%). In explain-
ing the low covariation, it could be suggested that health is a domain in 
which people do not have much objective knowledge nor opportunity 
to establish a valid perception of their expertise. However, the relative 
mean of the objective knowledge, as well as the participants’ judgement 
that the Health Knowledge Test was not too difficult, implies that the 
results cannot be explained by the participants’ low knowledge or lack 
of experience within the health domain. 
The low covariation between actual knowledge and SEA points to 
the possibility that the people’s judgment of their own level of expertise 
is biased. This is consistent with the finding regarding the significant 
interaction between NFC and EFNC in its effect on people’s SEA. The 
results show that, for high EFNC individuals, higher NFC was associ-
ated with higher SEA. In contrast, for low EFNC individuals, higher 
NFC was associated with lower SEA. That is, for high EFNC individu-
als, their level of NFC affected their level of SEA independent of their 
actual knowledge. It is possible to infer that higher NFC was associated 
with greater overestimations of  the partcipiants’ expertise and knowledge 
B SE β t p
Objective Knowledge (OK) .008 .003 .169 3.16 .002
Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) .032 .064 .027 .501 .617
Efficacy to Fulfill the Need for 
Cognitive Closure (EFNC) .057 .041 .075 1.37 .170
OK × NFC −.008 .004 −.802 −1.729 .085
OK × EFNC .000 .003 .013 .035 .972
NFC × EFNC .162 .058 .904 2.808 .005
OK × NFC × EFNC .004 .005 2.297 .956 .340
TABLE 2.  









SE t LLCI ULCI
1.33 −.37 .16 −2.31* −.68 −.05
1.56 −.36 .14 −2.26* −.62 −.04
1.80 −.29 .13 −2.19* −.56 −.03
2.03 −.26 .12 −2.10* −.50 −.01
2.26 −.22 .11 −1.99* −.44 −.01
2.31 −.21 .11 −1.96* −.43 .00
2.50 −.18 .10 −1.84 −.39 .01
2.73 −.15 .09 −1.65 −.33 .02
2.96 −.11 .08 −1.39 −.27 .04
3.20 −.07 .07 −1.04 −.22 .06
3.43 −.04 .06 −.60 −.17 .09
3.66 −.05 .06 −.07 −.13 .12
3.90 .03 .06 .51 −.09 .15
4.13 .07 .06 1.07 −.05 .19
4.36 .10 .06 1.54 −.02 .24
4.60 .14 .07 1.90 −.05 .28
4.64 .15 .07 1.96* .00 .30
4.83 .17 .08 2.16* .01 .34
5.06 .21 .09 2.34* .03 .39
5.30 .25 .10 2.46* .05 .45
5.53 .29 .11 2.55* .06 .51
5.76 .32 .12 2.61* .08 .57
6.00 .36 .13 2.65* .09 .63
TABLE 3.  
Simple Slopes of Participants' Self-Epistemic Authority on 
Participants' Need for Cognitive Closure According to Their 
Efficacy to Fulfill the Need for Cognitive Closure 
Note. ENFC = efficacy to fulfill the need for cognitive closure; SEA = self-
epistemic authority; NFC = need for cognitive closure; LLCI = lower level for 
confidence interval; ULCI = upper level for confidence interval.
* p < .05
ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGYRESEARCH ARTICLE
http://www.ac-psych.org2018 • volume 14(4) • 186-191190
in the health domain. This relationship between NFC and biased 
thinking has often been demonstrated (for reviews, see: Kruglanski, 
2012 ; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). 
However, the negative slope of SEA on NFC in the case of low EFNC 
individuals (even if nonsignificant) is clearly inconsistent with the lay 
epistemic theory. In contrast, this effect is consistent with Bar-Tal’s 
conceptualization of the cognitive motivational model and the empiri-
cal support for the disordinal interaction between NFC and EFNC on 
various manifestations of cognitive structuring (Bar-Tal, 2010; Bar-Tal 
& Guinote, 2002; Dolinska, Dolinski, & Bar-Tal, 2017; Kossowska & 
Bar-Tal, 2013; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002). 
In the context of the present study, the negative slope of SEA on 
NFC for low EFNC individuals may indicate that low EFNC/high 
NFC individuals either (a) display a biased underestimation or (b) a 
less overconfident and more accurate judgement of their level of SEA. 
However, if the second possibility were to be correct, it would result in 
a significant three-way interaction, as explicated in the Introduction 
section. The fact that the interaction between NFC and EFNC did not 
moderate the effect of objective knowledge on SEA (a nonsignificant 
three-way interaction) rather indicates that the low EFNC/high NFC 
individuals tend to underestimate their level of expertise in the health 
domain regardless of their actual level of health knowledge. 
This means that there are two independent sources of SEA, objec-
tive knowledge and a cognitive motivational epistemic process. In 
other words, people may perceive themselves as experts in two greatly 
different circumstances. In one, people perceive themselves as experts 
because they really are experienced and have the knowledge or the 
ability in a given domain. In the other, people tend to judge their level 
of expertise based on their epistemic motivations and their EFNC.
According to the lay epistemic theory, a high degree of EA con-
ferred upon a source may effect a freezing on a given judgement. Based 
on the results of our study, future research should investigate if this 
freezing effect of epistemic authority involves both epistemic motiva-
tion as well as the efficacy to fulfill it. 
Given the current study’s conclusions and explanations, it should 
be acknowledged that that we have tested the cognitive-motivational 
sources of SEA only in a medical context. To overcome this limitation, 
future studies should also focus on other contexts, where people can-
not form solid beliefs regarding their knowledge (e.g., the economic or 
political context). 
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